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Abstract A significant number of privatizations utilized to operate and maintain 
critical networked infrastructures have failed to meet contractual expectations and 
the expectations of the community. The author carried out empirical research ex-
ploring four urban water systems. This research revealed that of the four forms of 
privatization the alliance form was particularly suited to the stewardship of an ur-
ban water system. The question then is whether these findings from urban water 
can be generalised to O&M of infrastructure generally. The answer is increasingly 
important as governments seek financial sustainability through reapplying the con-
testability strategy and outsource and privatise further services and activities. This 
paper first examines the issues encountered with O & M privatisations. Second the 
findings as to the stewardship achieved by the four case study water systems are 
unpacked with particular focus upon the alliance form. Third the key variables 
which were found to have distinct causal links to the stewardship-like behaviour 
of the private participants in the Alliance case study are described. Fourth the var-
iables which may be crucial to the successful application of the alliance form to 
the broader range of infrastructures are separated out. Fifth this paper then sets the 
path for research into these crucial features of the alliance form. 
1.1 Issues with Privatisations 
Governments increasingly rely on the private sector to construct, operate, maintain 
and own public infrastructure. Governments had embraced New Public Manage-
ment (NPM) prescriptions including privatisation which they had believed would 
transfer political risk and be a medicine for economic risk, public funding short-
falls, and a capability gap. Yet in Australia some of the privatisations have not 
been successful resulting in governments bearing the political and economic risks. 
Governments have suffered significant political damage not only from the failures 
to adequately operate and maintain infrastructures such as hospitals, city train ser-
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vices and regional trains but also in the ‘buy back’ of the infrastructure where pub-
lic servants and government were ‘out-gunned’ by the private companies. The 
public has not accepted that the political risk can be outsourced and has continued 
to hold governments accountable for critical infrastructures, triggering this re-
search which sought to identify forms of privatization which achieve better stew-
ardship. 
An examination of the literature and archival sources revealed that the public 
disputation between governments and contractors over contractual scope and per-
formance was characterised by self-interest by both parties, a short-term view by 
both parties, distrust by government, and an inadequate contract management ca-
pability on the part of government entities. The contractual arrangements were 
consistent with the NPM economic rationalist forms of relationships which focus 
on the self-interest of the individual organisation (Denhardt & Denhardt 2007). 
These led to rent-seeking and opportunism on the part of some private infrastruc-
ture operators resulting in public values such as affordability and quality of ser-
vices not being satisfied. Those relationships are underpinned by traditional adver-
sarial contracts (Keast et al. 2005) which are based on Agency theory. Agency 
theory is built on assumptions such as goal conflict, information asymmetry, and 
the agent not having an appetite for risk, yet the literature regarding emerging 
forms of contractual relationships (Grimshaw, Vincent & Willmott 2002; Keast, 
Mandell & Brown 2006) suggested the possibility that these Agency theory as-
sumptions are highly likely to be incorrect in the context of modern inter-
organisational relationships. This research sought to identify an alternate theory 
which would provide a conceptualisation of the contractual relationship which 
does not focus on self-interest, emphasises convergence of goals and which, when 
applied, results in stewardship of critical infrastructures. 
Stewardship theory has emerged as a counterpoint to Agency theory, emphasis-
ing a range of factors that are argued to result in the agent acting as a steward. The 
steward is held to act in the interests of the principal, even when the interest of the 
steward and the principal are not aligned (Donaldson & Davis 1991, Davis et al. 
1997 & Van Slyke 2007). This tenet offered the possibility that if Stewardship 
theory was applied to the contractual relationships underpinning privatized infra-
structures then the actions and activities of the private company would be aligned 
with the goals of the government entity and stewardship achieved. Inherent within 
Stewardship Theory is the tenet that to achieve stewardship certain factors must be 
emphasised in the relationship. The factor sense of responsibility on the part of the 
agent offered the possibility of being highly important to the achievement of stew-
ardship. For that reason the research took a particular focus on the operation of 
that sense and the actions which increase that sense. 
 Thus the challenge for this research was to find out: 
 Whether stewardship of infrastructures was being achieved 
 The behaviour that characterises a steward 
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 How important it is that there is a sense of responsibility to the principal for 
stewardship to be achieved 
 The actions available to increase the steward’s sense of responsibility. 
1.2 The Findings as to Stewardship in the Case Study 
Privatizations 
The urban water industry in Australia provided a sufficient pool of case studies i.e. 
two identical BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer) contracts, one joint venture, 
one Alliance, and two identical management contracts which the government enti-
ty replaced with a single Next Generation (NG) alliance. 
The joint venture was comprised of two equal partnerships each between the 
government water entity and one of two international utilities companies. One 
partnership distributed utilities services and the other retailed those services. The 
two partnerships were governed by the same board. The government entity had 
entered into a 20 year contract with the two joint venture partnerships for the op-
eration and maintenance of the water system which remains owned by the gov-
ernment. The joint venture as steward was found to have achieved stewardship of 
the water system applying satisfaction of public values as the measure of steward-
ship, in this and all other case studies. 
The BOOT (Build Own Operate Transfer) case study was comprised of two 
similar 25 year concession form contracts, one between the government water en-
tity and an international utilities company for the construction, ownership and op-
eration of a single very large water filtration plant and the other between the gov-
ernment entity and a global utilities and transportation company for the same 
functions for two smaller plants. Both contracts provided the option for the gov-
ernment to acquire the system by transfer at the end of the contract. Stewardship 
had several dimensions, the stewardship of the quality of the water, the current 
stewardship of the infrastructure and the stewardship at the time of the possible 
transfer of ownership to government. The private operators achieved stewardship 
of the quality of the water. There was also currently stewardship of the systems 
and it was found highly likely that there will be stewardship of the plants when 
they are eligible for transfer to the government entity. 
The Alliance case study was a 10 year contract with a consortium of a private 
civil construction company and an engineering services company for operations 
and maintenance and capital works plus works for third parties in the name of the 
government entity. The relationship was configured in a typical modern alliance 
form, e.g. risk was allocated to the participant best able to bear the risk, the gov-
ernment entity contributed a significant number of employees, there was a no-
blame clause in the contract, all transactions are transparent and costs and gains 
are shared between the parties. The alliance was found to have achieved strong 
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stewardship of the water system yet the system remained owned by the govern-
ment. This is an important feature of this alliance model as the private ownership 
of water is vehemently opposed by the community (Prassad 2006). 
The management contracts case study was comprised of two identical contracts 
with two unrelated private companies for O&M services in contiguous regions. 
Recently the government replaced these two contracts with a single NG alliance 
stating in the tender documentation that the management contracts had not always 
encouraged a co-operative focus on business improvement and that there was a 
lack of alignment of goals and lack of collective responsibility for outcomes. The 
management contracts did not achieve stewardship of the water system. 
In summary the joint venture, BOOT and alliance forms of privatisation were 
found to have achieved stewardship of the infrastructure and the Alliance form 
was found to be the most effective in achieving stewardship because of the capaci-
ty to frequently (annually) adjust the performance targets and because the infra-
structure could remain in public ownership if this was required by the government. 
1.3 Key Variables that Impacted the Stewardship of the Water 
System by the Alliance Form 
The case studies revealed features which had a causal link to stewardship of the 
water system. These findings not only confirm the features of the general model of 
the alliance catalogued by Davies (2008) but highlight additional features. Collec-
tively the findings describe a model of a contractual relationship that is highly ef-
fective for the operation and maintenance of a networked critical infrastructure i.e. 
an urban water system. The features were found to increase or support the sense of 
responsibility of the private company, a factor which the case studies revealed to 
be highly important, and possibly essential from the perspective of the government 
entity, to the stewardship-like behavior of the private participants. Accordingly the 
impact of the features upon sense of responsibility, and in turn stewardship will be 
discussed together in the following paragraphs. 
1.3.1 Ownership and Governance 
The Alliance was a virtual organization with each participant retaining its own as-
sets, entering into contracts in its own name and the staff being employed by 
whichever participant was appropriate. The Alliance had a four member govern-
ance board of which the government entity has two members, one of which must 
be the chair. Contractual terms committed all parties to ensuring the highest stand-
ards of probity, transparency and open discussion of all financial and operational 
matters, including open-book accounting. The contract required that all decisions 
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of the board be unanimous and best for alliance. These governance arrangements, 
together with the mixing of employees from the three organizations were found to 
engender a sense of responsibility to the government entity. These features result-
ed in the expertise of the private sector being accessed without government sur-
rendering ownership of the infrastructure or ceasing to maintain its own staff ca-
pability to operate the system. 
1.3.2 Suitability of Participants 
The cross-case comparison revealed that sense of responsibility of the private par-
ticipants and stewardship are impacted strongly by both their own suitability and 
the suitability of the government entity and its staff. 
All the private participants were large public companies jealous of their reputa-
tion which they protected by acting with a strong sense of responsibility to the 
principal. They reasoned that behaving this way would also lead to their gaining 
additional work with third parties by way of a business reference from the gov-
ernment entity. Private participants advised that their experience of other O&M 
contracts resulted in their knowing that they must not conduct themselves as they 
would for a construction contract focusing on immediate profit but rather must 
take a longer-term view and be co-operative and collaborative. Sense of responsi-
bility to the government entity was inadequate in the two management contracts to 
such an extent that the government entity when going to market for the replace-
ment single alliance required that one of the criterion for selection for the NG alli-
ance was evidence of sense of responsibility to the principal in other, existing con-
tracts. 
In the Alliance government entity suitability went similarly to the issue of not 
taking a short-term perspective. Government entity staff took the perspective that 
the private companies were legitimate partners who must be commercial and make 
a profit. In contrast in the management contracts the government entity displayed 
a short-term focus upon immediate cost and entity staff were said to conduct the 
relationship denigrating the contractor and taking a command-and-control ap-
proach. The Alliance model obviated this command and control separation by 
placing a significant number of its own staff within the Alliance and requiring that 
the Alliance general manager and chief finance officer be appointed by the gov-
ernment entity. 
In addition the Alliance participants not taking a short-term perspective was ac-
companied by strong evidence of trust, more precisely of trust which the case 
study informants portrayed as reciprocal and presenting in a manner not unlike the 
‘high-trust spiral’ conceptualised by Fox (1974). The parties prior to entering into 
the Alliance contract had significant experience of each other having contracted 
for operations and maintenance services on a schedule of works basis, suggesting 
the possibility that the high trust has grown over a unusually long period. 
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1.3.3 Clear Contractual Outcomes 
The cross-case comparison showed that a regime of comprehensive monthly re-
porting against highly specified measures engendered a strong sense of responsi-
bility because of the clarity as to what is expected. 
The Alliance was characterised by all informants asserting that annual adjust-
ment of the targets for performance indicators and the incentive payment being 
tied to the achievement of these targets led to a highly focused sense of responsi-
bility. The joint venture targets were adjusted 4 or 5 yearly by negotiation with the 
government entity, this period aligning with the re-set of the prices by the inde-
pendent regulator. The joint venture advised that the inability to adjust the targets 
more frequently was onerous because of the frequent increase in costs, e.g. energy, 
chemicals and labour. The Alliance annual adjustment offers greater opportunity 
for all parties to address risks. 
1.3.4 Incentives to Private Participants 
Incentives had the greatest impact on sense of responsibility, confirming the 
Agency Theory model of agents (the private companies) being motivated to act in 
the interests of the principal by extrinsic rewards. 
Financial incentives in the BOOTs case study were in the form of a usage 
charge which varied with the quantity and quality of raw water delivered to the 
plant operator or delivered by the operator. This charge nicely fits the risk to the 
operator if the raw water is of poor quality and penalises the operator if it supplies 
water which is below the quality required in the contract. The informants asserted 
that this regime led to the companies acting with a sense of responsibility. In the 
Alliance the capital work was incentivised by a gain share/pain share payment. 
For O&M work the margin added to all work performed by the companies was in-
creased if the annual targets are met. 
A longer-term contract was very important to private participants and was seen 
by government entity informants as an incentive to act with a sense of responsibil-
ity. The terms of the contracts in the case studies where stewardship of the water 
systems were achieved were 10 years, 20 years, and 25 years. The informants be-
lieved these contracts were attractive to private company owners when compared 
with construction contracts which were typically 2 to 3 years. The longer term of 
water O&M contracts allowed the companies to establish their operations and in 
subsequent years harvest significant profit through efficiencies gained by invest-
ment in technologies, negotiation of reduced prices for inputs. The contracts typi-
cally had provision for extension which was seen as an incentive for acting with a 
sense of responsibility and for high quality performance. The longer term of the 
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contract meant the government were able to hold the private companies accounta-
ble for work carried out earlier in the contract term. 
Additional works, either provided for in the contract or gained from like water 
systems by association with the government entity was found to be a powerful in-
centive to act with a sense of responsibility. The Alliance contract provided for 
additional work such as capital works at the discretion of the principal. The Alli-
ance contract also allowed the Alliance to provide services to third parties such as 
smaller water systems in the name of the government entity. This work has been 
grown to a significant value and has allowed the civil engineering private partici-
pant to accelerate the industry uptake of its propriety technology. The Alliance 
private participants advised that their companies adopted the strategy of acting 
strongly in the interests of the government entity in the expectation that a favora-
ble reference from the government entity would lead to work from like water sys-
tems. 
1.4 The Possibility of Generalisability to Other Infrastructures 
These features of the Alliance were found to make the alliance form of privatisa-
tion highly effective in stewardship of the urban water infrastructure whilst allow-
ing the government to retain ownership of the system. However, the issue of infra-
structure ownership and many of those features are either typical of urban water, 
e.g. the ease of specifying the outcomes and the scrutiny by independent external 
bodies, or unique to the particular case study, e.g. the parties having established 
reciprocal trust pre-contract. The task then is to distinguish the features which 
might limit the generalizability of the findings to other networked infrastructures 
or other infrastructures which are not core to the government entity’s purpose but 
nonetheless are essential. The features which contributed to the stewardship by the 
alliance form will first be drawn together in a taxonomy and then those which 
have the possibility of not being present in other candidate privatisations will be 
discussed. 
Features of alliance privatisation which contributed to sense of responsibility 
and stewardship: 
 Risk being allocated to the participant best able to bear that risk 
 Contractual outcomes specified with great clarity 
 Transparency of transactions between alliance participants 
 Information symmetry 
 Intense measurement, rigid reporting and incentives 
 Transparency to the public through external reporting and independent scrutiny 
 Long term of contracts 
 Contributing a significant proportion of the alliance staffing  
 Culture and capability to establish and manage contracts with private sector 
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 Reciprocal trust 
These features fall into two categories, namely those features of a candidate 
privatisation which are readily assessed and those that are difficult to assess but 
their absence in the candidate may be critical to the possibility the privatisation 
succeeding. An example of those which are easily assessed is the extent to which 
outcomes can be clearly specified and internal and external reporting instituted. 
Those that are not readily assessed are the culture and capability of the govern-
ment entity to establish and manage the contract, and the capability of the gov-
ernment entity staff to engender reciprocal trust with the private company staff. 
Because the literature and understanding of government entity culture and capabil-
ity, and the operation of trust in the context of alliance privatisations is underde-
veloped a significant risk to the success of privatisations is presented. 
The government entity having the culture appropriate to participate in an alli-
ance was demonstrated by the Alliance case study. The management contracts 
case study demonstrated that both the governance arrangements and the percep-
tions and conduct of individual government entity staff who interfaced into the 
contracting companies could negatively impact the success of the contract. A sec-
ond, key aspect of the culture that was inappropriate was the perception by gov-
ernment entity staff that contractors were not to be trusted and that a command-
and-control approach was appropriate, rather than the collaboration found in the 
Alliance case study. The government entity recognised these deficiencies and re-
placed the management contracts with a single alliance with a single governance 
body and configured the NG alliance so that 30 per cent of the alliance staff were 
from the government entity. This finding of inappropriate perception as to the alli-
ance relationship suggests that for government entities there may be a continuum 
of suitability for participation in privatisation, ranging from the highly effective 
approach taken in the Alliance case study down to a combative, normative Agency 
Theory model characterised by an absence of trust. 
Trust was palpable in the Alliance case study which had the benefit of the three 
parties to the Alliance contract having earlier experience of each other in the 
schedule of rates era which preceded the Alliance contract. Trust has been found 
to mitigate the problems in privatisations that arise from lack of competition and 
difficulties in specification and monitoring (Alford 2009). However Alford (2009) 
found that turbulence (frequent change in government organisations), complexity 
across government, accountability requirements upon government entities and 
staff, and the differing organisational cultures between government and private 
partners presented as obstacles to building trust. Alford (2009) observed that as 
these factors were inherent to public management it is likely that they could not be 
eliminated, but rather only ameliorated. Alford (2009) that the amelioration could 
be achieved by: selection of staff who have particular skills e.g. networking, nego-
tiation and influencing and values which do not jar with those of the partnership 
and by changing the structure of the government organization so that it better fits 
with the partnership. Alford (2009) provided examples of how those structural and 
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people changes might be made but much remains unanswered as to how to deter-
mine where on the suitability continuum the government entity currently sits and 
where it must be before commencing the privatisation of the activity. 
The capability of the government entity to establish a contract on the appropri-
ate terms and in turn manage that contract so that the required outcomes are 
achieved was displayed in the Alliance, joint venture and BOOTs case studies. 
The government entity in the BOOT’s achieved strong contract management allo-
cating the responsibility to the executive position responsible for the delivery of 
the outcome, i.e. safe drinking water, and adequately resourcing routines that in-
volved the several levels of interfaces between the organizations. In the joint ven-
ture the 50% ownership by the government entity and contractual requirements as 
to comprehensive reporting and information symmetry allowed the government 
entity to manage the contract very effectively using limited resources. In the Alli-
ance, features such as staff embedded in the Alliance workforce, the contract spec-
ifying that the Alliance general manager and chief finance officer are to be chosen 
by the government entity only and the government entity retaining outside the Al-
liance the capability to plan and design the system resulted in strong contract 
management. 
This capability to organise the management of substantial contracts with pri-
vate providers is typical of the urban water industry and critical networked infra-
structures generally. Yet privatisation is increasingly being applied to infrastruc-
tures and services which support, but are not themselves, the core activity of the 
government entity. Examples are the buildings and pathology and housekeeping 
services required for a modern hospital or the provision of information technology 
to community services agencies. Contract administration has been described as the 
neglected stepchild (Kelman 2002) and governments have been found to be reluc-
tant to invest in the capacity to manage outsourced services (Brown & Pitowski 
2004). For that reason it would seem desirable that a better understanding of the 
components of appropriate contract management be identified with sufficient 
specificity to establish a framework to be applied to candidate privatisations. 
1.5 The Research Path 
That there was strong capability within water entities to establish and then manage 
contracts for privatised services is unremarkable in that managing such systems 
and putting to contract substantial construction projects is what those entities have 
done for hundreds of years. What is remarkable is the expectation of governments 
that there will be no significant political risk from entities which have limited or 
no experience establishing and managing contracts with massive international 
companies which are deeply experienced in managing contracts with govern-
ments. To assist in minimizing the number of privatisations which fail which be-
cause features of the government entity are inappropriate this paper will establish 
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the path of research to further develop the knowledge of the alliance model of pri-
vatisation from the perspective of government. 
The areas of research are: 
 The capability of government entities to establish and manage an appropriate 
long-term contract. 
 The culture within the government entity including the capability and capacity 
to establish and maintain a high trust environment that is suitable to participate 
in an alliance relationship. 
The methodology for this proposed research will not be fixed until completion 
of the first stage, an exhaustive exploration of both the immediate literature, e.g. 
privatisation, culture (Schein 1985) or reciprocal trust (Fox 1974) and the broader, 
related literature extending into areas such as procurement, culture and change 
management. 
In respect of the capability to establish and manage an appropriate contract it is 
proposed that the objective of the first stage will be to assemble a framework 
comprised of the component elements and skills involved in specifying the service 
to be provided by an alliance and then creating and conducting an effective tender 
process. A second, similar framework of functions and skills required to effective-
ly manage an ongoing contract will be developed during this stage. Dependent up-
on the extent of the information available from this exploration of the broader lit-
erature it may be possible to form both these frameworks. If that is possible then a 
logical next stage would be the testing of these frameworks by way of application 
to case study privatisations. 
The dimensions of the culture required to give effect to that management of the 
alliance relationship will be developed utilising the hierarchy of organisational 
culture (the tangible artefacts, the professed values and the tacit and unspoken 
values) established by Schein (1985) . The specific dimension, the preparedness of 
government entity staff to trust private service providers, will be explored com-
mencing with the work of Fox (1974) and Alford (2009). The objective is to estab-
lish the dimensions of that trust and provide an accompanying framework of fac-
tors which impact trust. 
Accordingly this research points scholars, government and industry towards the 
use of the alliance form of privatisation for a broad range of infrastructure privati-
sations. This paper sets the path for further research aimed at increasing the 
knowledge of the capability of government entities to establish and manage con-
tracts and the dimensions of the culture which supports the appropriate manage-
ment of alliance privatisation contracts. 
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